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APOLLO EXPERIENCEREPORT
GUI DANCEAND CONTROLSYSTEMS:
COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE STABI LI ZATION
AND CONTROLSYSTEM
By Orval P. Littleton
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
SUMMARY
A description of the stabilization and control system for the Apollo command and
service module is presented in this report. The main areas discussed are concepts,
design, development, testing, and flight results.
The stabilization and control system requirements initially consisted of three
main areas: attitude reference, displays and controls (including automatic thrust-
vector control), and reaction control. After extensive simulations, manual thrust-
vector control was added. Also, the Block I system was designed to allow for
performing onboard maintenance. However, because of humidity problems encountered
during Project Mercury and the time required to isolate and correct representative
problems, the onboard maintenance capability was deleted in favor of the Block II
concept. In lieu of onboard maintenance, the Block II design featured hermetically
sealed devices, potted cordwood construction, and redundancy in critical areas (for
example, two gyroscope packages; two rotation hand controllers; two flight director
attitude indicators; and redundant translation, abort, thrust on/off, and thrust-vector
control paths).
The stabilization and control system performed satisfactorily on the 4 unmanned
and 11 manned flights of the Apollo Program. This performance can be attributed to
conservative design techniques; to the use of state-of-the-art components; to extensive
developmental, qualification, and acceptance testing; to extensive vehicle checkout at
prime-contractor facilities and at the NASA John F. Kennedy Space Center; and to
various simulation programs at the NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (formerly
the Manned Spacecraft Center) and at contractor facilities. Recommendations for
future programs are given.
INTRODUCTION
Initially, the command and service module (CSM) stabilization and control system
(SCS) was to provide the capability for controlling spacecraft rotation and translation,
an attitude reference system (ARS), and the displays necessary to allow the astronauts
to monitor automatic operation as well as to exercise optimum control of the spacecraft
during manual maneuvers. A primary design requirement was that no single failure
would result in the loss of the spacecraft or the flight crew. Because of the predicted
high accelerations from the service propulsion system (SPS) engine, manual thrust-
vector control (MTVC) was not considered feasible and thus was not required. Exten-
sive simulations subsequently showed that MTVC could be used effectively by the
astronauts, however, and MTVC became the primary backup mode used in the event
of a failure in the primary guidance, navigation, and control system (PGNCS).
From early in the program (November 1961) until the major redesign in
June 1964, the SCS was the primary method of flight control; that is, the SCS was in
series with the guidance and navigation (G&N) system (fig. I). As the primary method
of flight control, the system had to be highly reliable to meet the mission requirements.
Despite the efforts of reliability and design engineers, the equipment mean time be-
tween failure was of the same order of magnitude as the mission time. Hence, the
most feasible solution to the problem was to provide standby redundancy in the form
of onboard spares.
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Figure I.- Diagram of the Block I guidance and navigation attitude control mode.
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The SCS was initially planned with complete standby redundancy in the form of
plug-in modules or subassembly spares, or both. With the aid of simple checkout
equipment, the crewmen would be able to detect malfunctions at the module or sub-
assembly level and to make the necessary replacements. The mean time to repair
(estimated to be 30 minutes) was not believed to be significant during the midcourse
trajectory because attitude-disturbing torques would be small and trajectory corrections
could be made after the system was restored to normal operation.
In 1963, problems involving humidity, connectors, single-point failures, and
relays led to a new design, called Block II. The details of these problems are dis-
cussed later. Definition of the Block II concept resulted in elimination of in-flight
maintenance; adoption of hermetic sealing of devices for humidity purposes; use of
state-of-the-art connectors; and addition of redundant control paths and, eventually,
of special screening tests to improve the reliability of the relays. It was also
specified that backup steering would be provided by the SCS in the differential-velocity
(AV) modes during the transearth injection phase and during the translunar and trans-
earth midcourse velocity corrections.
As a backup to the PGNCS, the Block II SCS provides stabilization and control of
the spacecraft for rotation, translation, and SPS thrusting (using the CSM reaction
control system (RCS) engines and the SPS engine). The Block II SCS also provides the
required displays and controls to permit the necessary crew interface with the con-
trolling elements. There are additional interfaces with the PGNCS (fig. 2).
The Block II definition phase covered the period from June 4 to August 18, 1964.
This phase was a period of cooperative effort between the prime contractors and NASA
to determine the feasibility of the Block II approach, to establish requirements in the
interface areas, and to detail the mechanization. The evolution of the SCS design is
shown in the time line in figure 3. A discussion of the final design follows.
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DISCUSSION
Attitude Control System
The attitude control system (ACS) provides backup attitude flight control capa-
bility for the spacecraft during all mission phases and also provides for thrusting of
the SPS engine. The ACS can be operated in either the automatic or the manual mode.
Propulsive force is provided by 16 hypergolic-propellant, nonthrottleable engines
(nominally 445-newton (100 pound) thrust), and low limit-cycle rates are maintained
by pseudorate feedback.
The ACS is contained within the SCS and is composed of the electronics necessary
to accept command signals from the rotation and translation hand controls, rate and
attitude-error signals from the ARS, and configuration switching signals from the
main control panel. The ACS causes the CSM RCS jets to fire in such a manner as to
control vehicle motion.
The ACS provides the following backup functions in case of a primary control
system failure, or in those instances when a shutdown of the primary system is desired.
1. Holds the spacecraft attitude within a selectable dead band, using error
signals from the ARS
2. Provides for manual control of spacecraft attitude in the following four
configurations: proportional rate commands, on/off acceleration commands to the
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RCS solenoid automatic coils, minimum-impulse commands from the rotation hand
controller (RHC) to the RCS solenoid automatic coils, and on/off acceleration commands
from the RHC direct switches to the RCS solenoid direct coils
3. Provides for manual translation commands in six directions with the trans-
lation hand controller (THC)
4. Provides for automatic rate stabilization of the vehicle
5. Provides for manual ullage commands to either the automatic or the direct
RCS solenoid coils
6. Provides override logic for compatibility between automatic and manual
operation (Astronaut direct commands take precedence and cause the appropriate
automatic functions to be inhibited. )
A simplified functional block diagram of the single-axis ACS is given in figure 4.
The ACS thruster arrangement is shown in figure 5.
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Figure 4.- Functional schematic of the attitude control system.
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Attitude Reference System
The purpose of the Block II ARS is to provide a backup attitude reference
capability for the Apollo spacecraft control functions. The primary attitude reference
is provided by the PGNCS. The ARS consists of two sets of three body-mounted
attitude gyroscopes, either set of which can be used in the rate mode, and a coupler
unit that generates Euler angles. The principal problem with the ARS was the drift
rate; the problem was solved by improved design and increased knowledge of this
equipment.
In providing a backup attitude reference capability for spacecraft flight control
operations, the following functions are performed by the ARS.
1. Provides vehicle attitude errors (in body coordinates) to the vehicle backup
control system during the coast and thrusting phases
2. Provides vehicle attitude errors (in body coordinates) for display on attitude-
error needles
3. Provides a set of Euler angles, which describes the orientation of the vehicle
reference frame with respect to some inertial reference frame, for display on a three-
axis attitude ball
4. Provides total roll angle (about the command module (CM) stability axis) for
display during entry
5. Provides resolution of small Euler angular errors (treated as vector quan-
tities) into body-axis errors for display on attitude-error needles (Theseangular
errors are the difference betweena set of Euler angles that describes the desired
vehicle orientation anda set that describes the actual vehicle orientation. )
Controls and Displays System
The controls and displays system (figs. 6 and 7) provides the hand controllers,
the flight instruments, and the dial settings necessary for the astronaut to monitor
and controlthe spacecraft during the various flight modes. The principaldevelopmental
problem associated with the controls and displays was fraying and fracturing of the
cabling for the hand controllers. The design trade-offs among durability, flexibility,
and flammability were so difficult that advancement in the design of flexible cabling
was the final solution.
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System description.- The control functions and the display functions of the
controls and displays system are described in the following paragraphs.
Control functions" The control functions of the Apollo SCS are provided by the
translation controller (fig. 8), the rotation controller (fig. 9), and the attitude-set
control panel (ASCP) (fig. 10).
The translation controller (1) provides manual acceleration control of the space-
craft (CSM combination only) rectilinear motion in both directions along the three
principal axes, (2) initiates a CSM/Saturn IVB (S-IVB) abort command to the space-
craft mission sequencer by counterclockwise rotation of the controller handle,
(3) transfers spacecraft thrust-vector control (TVC) from the PGNCS to the SCS by
clockwise rotation of the controller handle, and (4) is capable of simultaneous multi-
axis actuation.
\Figure 8.- Translation controller. Figure 9.- Rotation controller.
Figure 10.- Attitude-set control panel.
The rotation controller (1) provides
three-axis manual proportional body-rate
commands or direct angular acceleration (by
switch selection) for spacecraft rotational
motion in both directions about the three prin-
cipal axes from breakout switch actuation
(1.5 ° travel from neutral) to the soft stops (10 °),
(2) provides emergency angular acceleration
commands directly to the RCS jet solenoids by
controller emergency direct switches (11 °),
(3) provides manual proportional SPS-
engine gimbal-position control in pitch and
yaw during MTVC, and (4) is capable of
simultaneous multiaxis actuation.
The ASCP provides selectable, three-
axis, spacecraft inertial-pointing signals
by means of thumbwheel controls and dial
readouts. These signals are summed with
either the PGNCS inertial measurement
unit (IMU) or the SCS gyroscope display
coupler (GDC) inertial-attitude signals to
produce total-attitude-error signals that
S-410 9
are displayed on the flight director attitude indicator (FDAI) attitude-error needlesto
allow precise manual rotation maneuvers to the selected inertial angles.
Display functions: The display functions of the Apollo SCSare provided by the
FDAI (fig. 11)and the gimbal-position andfuel-pressure indicator (GP/FPI) {fig. 12).
The FDAI performs the following functions.
1. Provides an inside-out display of
the spacecraft attitude with respect to a
selected inertial frame of reference by
meansof a graduatedthree-axis ball and
appropriate reference indexes
2. Provides a "fly-to" display of the
spacecraft angular position relative to an
inertial reference in all three axes by
meansof attitude-error needles
3. Provides a fly-to display of the
spacecraft angular rate about eachof the
three mutually perpendicular spacecraft
body axesbefore the 0.05g level during
entry (After 0.05g is reached, the dis-
plays provide the angular rate aboutthe
spacecraft pitch axis andabout the roll and
yaw entry axes.)
Figure 11.- Flight director attitude
indicator.
4. Provides a centralized display of
attitudes, vehicle rates, and attitude errors
5. Provides coarse attitude orienta-
tion (obtainablewith the ball) and fine
orientation using attitude-error needles
6. Indicates the IMU maneuver limits
andthe approachof these limits during
maneuvers
7. Provides a monitor anda cross-
check of reference-equipment conditions
by comparing body-axis rates adjacent to
body-axis attitude errors
8. Provides a monitor of the SCS
executionof reference-system commands
in three axesby three commandneedles
Figure 12.- Gimbal-position and
fuel-pressure indicator.
9. Provides variable scale factors in
rate and error indications for varying pre-
cision of the maneuvers required during the
different mission phases
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The GP/FPI (1) displays the Saturn II fuel andoxidizer pressures on oneof the
sets of redundantmeter movementsduring boost, (2) displays the S-IVB fuel and
oxidizer pressures on the other set of redundantmeter movementsduring boost,
(3) displays the angular position of the service module (SM) main propulsion engine
gimbal aboutthe pitch andyaw axes, oneon eachof the dual sets of meter movements,
and (4) provides for manually inserting initial-condition commandsignals into the actu-
ator servosystems for both pitch andyawby meansof thumbwheelcontrols.
Problems.- Listed in the following paragraphs are the major problems that
occurred during design and development of the Block II SCS controls and displays.
Flight director attitude indicator: Problems were encountered in the design of
the FDAI in the following areas.
1. Spacecraft installation: During the development of the new Block II FDAI
having an instrument panel backmounting feature, the need to support a thermal cold-
plate from the rear face presented a major vibration susceptibility problem. Because
the FDAI was cantilevered from the front face, the need arose to provide structural
support at the rear face without interfering with the coldplate. The design solution
required redesign of the coldplate to incorporate through holes, modification of the
FDAI backplate to receive supporting pins, and addition of supporting pins to the
secondary structure. The obvious effect of this design was the loss of ready access
to both the FDAI and the coldplate for maintenance.
2. Needle vibration: Because of the thinness, the length, and the cantilevered
support of the attitude-error needles, redesign was required as a result of vibration
testing. These needles were made more rugged to withstand the vibration environment.
3. Electroluminescent (EL) lighting: When the Block H control and display re-
design was instituted, the contractor implemented the use of integral EL lighting.
The SCS subcontractor experienced difficulties in orienting commercial vendors to
aerospace requirements. In addition, problems were encountered with the consistency
of EL lamp characteristics, with the reflections and aberrations from nearby surfaces,
and with the uniformity of light intensity and color. These problems ultimately were
resolved, but the contractor was forced to change the EL power and power factor
requirements. It was found that better lamp operation was obtained when the supply
voltage was higher than the nominal spacecraft voltage.
4. Lighting control: A Variac transformer is part of the spacecraft wiring so
that display lighting intensity can be varied. The current surge resulting from on/off
operation of the lighting control loads the alternating-current inverter and, thereby,
causes line voltage variations. These voltage variations cause rate-sensor oscillations,
which result in inadvertent reaction jet firings. To minimize this effect, a resistor
was placed across the Variac transformer, and the spacecraft operational procedures
were changed so that the display lights were dimmed but not turned off.
Attitude-set control panel: During vibration testing, the ASCP attitude-set
thumbwheels tended to drift slowly. To eliminate this problem, friction-type disks
were incorporated into the thumbwheel support mechanism.
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Handcontrollers: The following problems were encounteredwith the hand
controllers.
1. Cabling: Major problems occurred with the cables from both the RHCand
the THC. Becauseof their exposedpositions in the CM cabin, the cables were sub-
jected to excessivewear andtear during checkout. Constantmovementandstowage
flexed the cablesuntil cracks appeared. Removalof the outer cable covering exposed
a Teflon braid that had no abrasion or puncture resistance. Whenapplied to the cables,
other nonflammablematerials either cracked whenflexed or were not sufficiently
flexible. Strain relief of the cables at the point of exit from the enclosures was a
major problem becausethe excessivestrains actually encounteredwere not originally
envisionedand, consequently, were not specified in the initial design requirements.
The subsequentrade-off amongmaterial flammability, durability, andflexibility
characteristics proved to be extremely difficult. The useof a special covering andthe
restriction of hand-controller use during the groundtest phasesolved the problem.
An alternate handcontroller also wasusedduring this time.
2. Handleshapeandforce characteristics: The handleshapeandthe force/
deflection characteristics are subjectiverequirements andweredefined onlyafter a long
and tediousevolutionary process. The designwaschangedcontinually during the middle
period of the program, evenafter hardware commitments hadbeenmade. A belated
solution was the generationbythe NASALyndonB. JohnsonSpaceCenter (JSC)(formerly
the MannedSpacecraftCenter (MSC))of the specifications in this particular area.
Thrust-Vector Control System
The TVC system provides flight control of the Apollo spacecraft during thrusting
of the SM SPS. The system provides for both automatic and manual control about all
three body axes when the CSM and the lunar module (LM) are docked (CSM/LM con-
figuration) and when the CSM and LM are undocked (CSM-only configuration). A
detailed discussion of the TVC system, the design requirements, the problems, and
the changes made throughout the Apollo SCS TVC development is presented in the
following paragraphs.
System description.- The description of the TVC system includes control modes
and functional requirements.
Control modes: The Apollo spacecraft has several modes for controlling powered
flight. The modes can be divided into the two major categories of primary and back-
up. The primary system uses the command module computer. The backup system is
composed of analog components and includes automatic and manual control. Control
modes for the TVC system are discussed in the following paragraphs. A functional
diagram of the TVC system is shown in figure 13.
1. Primary automatic mode: The Apollo Block II primary TVC system does
not use the SCS electronics but uses an all-digital controller that sends commands
directly to the SPS engine-gimbal servomechanism through a digital to analog converter.
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2. Backupautomatic mode: In the backupautomatic mode(referred to as the
SCSAV mode}, the TVC system uses information from the SPSengine-gimbal servo-
mechanism(position) andfrom the vehicle attitude andrate gyroscopesto generateand
send control signals through the SCSTVC electronics to the SPSengine-gimbal servo-
mechanism. The system doesnot operate on anattitude commandsignal but automat-
ically holds the thrust vector fixed in inertial space. This procedure limits the use of
the modeto real-time SPS-engineburns.
3. Manualmode: The manualmode of operation (referred to as direct or rate
MTVC) provides for commandsfrom the pilot tothe SPSengine-gimbal servomechanism
by meansof a proportional handcontroller.
4. Roll axis control: For eachof the operational modesjust described, the pitch
andyaw axesare controlled by the angular motion of the SPSengine. The roll axis,
however, is controlled by firing the SM RCSjets. The roll control maybe completely
automatic, completely manual, or a combinationof both.
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Figure 13.- Functional schematic of the thrust-vector control system.
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Functional requirements of the SCSTVC: To fulfill functional requirements, the
SCSTVC must provide pointing andstabilization during the thrusting maneuvers, which
include midcourse corrections, lunar-orbit insertion, transearth injection, Earth-
orbital retrofire, andhigh-altitude aborts. The SCSTVC also must provide for stable
operation of the SPSengine-gimbal servomechanism.
Problems.- In developing a TVC system of the magnitude required for the
Apollo Program, many problems were encountered. Some problems were not signif-
icant enough to record; only the more significant problems and the manner in which
they were resolved are detailed here.
The SPS actuator development: Problems in design of the SPS electromechanical
actuator were primarily caused by difficulties in the development of the electromagnetic
clutch. The principal problems with the clutch were overheating and nonlinearity.
The nonlinear effects, although affecting the vehicle limit cycle and making one actuator
appear slightly different from another, did not interfere substantially with the system
operation. The primary cause of clutch overheating was thrust misalinement during
the SPS burns. The overheating caused a decrease in clutch gain, not only for that
burn but also for subsequent burns. This gain decrease could have been as great as
50 percent. However, a new actuator could have had a clutch gain of greater than
50 percent of nominal. As a result, the control system had to be designed to allow for
clutch-gain variations of _- 50 percent.
Three design changes were made to the actuator in an attempt to prevent clutch
overheating. Overheating was eventually prevented by changing the gearing of the
motor to the clutches. The slip speed between the rotating input and the stationary
output members of the clutches was less, and the subsequent heat generation was less.
The penalty for the design change was that, for a given motor speed, the SPS-engine
bell moved more slowly.
Large-signal stability: A direct result of lowering the SPS actuator rate capa-
bility was a loss of some large initial-condition or nonlinear stability capabilities.
When the Block II system was designed, the large-signal stability problem was resolved
by a combination of imposing smaller limits on the SPS gimbal excursion and of lower-
ing the autopilot gains.
Pointing error: As a direct result of lowering the autopilot gains to eliminate
the large-signal stability problems, the pointing error requirements were degraded;
the degradation, however, was shown to be acceptable for Apollo missions.
Body-bending data variation: The variation in body-bending data was a major
problem. The original design was based on the first set of data (1963). In April 1965,
NASA deleted modal testing for the CSM and for the CSM/LM. As a result, the auto-
pilot was changed to be less sensitive to body bending in September 1965. At that time,
tolerances of _+15 percent for the bending frequency and ± 10 percent for the mode shape
were assumed.
In the spring of 1965, a subcontractor performed a modal analysis by which the
structure was separated into the component parts rather than assumed to be a beam.
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Thesedata indicated a first-mode frequency 50percent less than that of the 1963data.
This variation was considerably outside the 15-percent tolerance; however, the data
were consideredpreliminary.
In January 1966, on the first Block I flight spacecraft (spacecraft 009), a TVC
system instability occurred during checkouton the launchpad at the NASAJohn F.
KennedySpaceCenter. Evaluation of the data indicated that the causewasprobably
a body-bendingresonanceat approximately 17hertz. The bendinganalysis at that
time indicated that in the free-free (flight) mode, the resonancewouldbe in excessof
30hertz. Althoughthe test was performed on the Saturn IB stack, it was believed
that 17hertz could be indicative of a free-free modeat the CM/SM interface. The
Block I TVC system wasmodified andthe instability corrected. However,considerable
doubtwas cast on the analytically generatedbendingdata. The first two Block I
vehicles did not exhibit any in-flight TVC instability, althoughcomponentsof signals
at approximately 17hertz were evident in the rate gyroscopetraces of every Block I
flight. Shortly thereafter_ themodalanalysis task wasreassignedto another contractor.
In the late summer of 1966, the prime contractor producedanother set of
bendingdata. The CSM/LM analysis indicated a first-mode frequency of 1.12 hertz,
which was in agreementwith previously establisheddata. At that time, notice was
given that the Block II SCSwas unstableand that modifications, if required, would
haveto be madepromptly if existing hardware scheduleswere to be met.
Shortly thereafter, a decision was made to redesign the SCSto provide adequate
stability margins for all existing sets of bendingdata. The performance requirements
were changedto the final value at that time. This relaxation was required because
system performance was degradedwhenthe system gainswere reducedto the extent
necessary to provide adequatestability for the range of bendingdataused. The SCS
electronic componentsfabricated were designedto accommodatedominant modal
frequencies in the range of 1.0 to 1.6 hertz.
Revised (December1966)subcontractor stiffness data for the LM were forwarded
to the prime contractor from MSC. Using the revised data, frequencies were deter-
minedfor the CSM/LM half-full propellant-loading condition in April 1967. The first
three frequencies were 2.15, 2.6, and2.9 hertz. Also at that time, subcontractordata
were available for the CSM/LM quarter-full propellant-loading condition. The first
two bendingmodeswere 2.1 and 2.4 hertz. In the summer of 1968, it was decided
to modify several spare electronics boxesto a designbasedonbendingin the 1.75- to
2.86-hertz range. Modal testing in late summer of 1968indicated bendingfrequencies
of 2.76, 3.02, and 3.87 hertz. A decision to makethe newdesign commonto all
spacecraft subsequentto spacecraft 103(Apollo 8) resulted in fabrication of three
separate autopilot configurations as flight articles before the first CSM/LM flight.
The first CSM/LM flight spacecraft (Apollo 9) wasused as the test article for an in-
flight margin-stroking test. The results showedthe first and secondbendingmodes
to be approximately 2.76 and 3.1 hertz, respectively.
Propellant slosh: The SMand LM propellant-slosh dynamic stability was a
concernbecauseof the lack of baffles in any of the tanks to provide damping, the lack
of definition of the slosh dynamics data, andthe existence of dynamic changesin the
slosh databecauseof the vehicle center-of-gravity motion. Although theseconcerns
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were not resolved completely, they were resolved to the extent that the total vehicle
stability wasnot a problem during a given SPS-engineburn.
Bending-compensationtechniquefor the CSM/LM configuration: As previously
mentioned, the unavailability of goodbendingdata resdlted in the implementation of
three different CSM/LM bending-compensationdesigns. Although lack of datawas the
primary cause, the techniqueusedfor the compensationdesignwaspartly responsible
for the three completeredesigns. Frequencybandfiltering wasused in conjunction
with the notch filter technique. The notch filter was sensitive to both increases and
decreases inlhe bendingfrequencies, whereas the rolloff-type filter was sensitive
primarily to decreases. The rolloff filter canbe designedsuchthat frequency
decreasescanbe handledby phasestabilization (andincreases, usually, by gain
stabilization), whereas the notch filter is limited to an "either/or" compensation
technique. In retrospect, it is evident that rolloff filtering of the bendingdynamics
could haveprevented someof the cost of the final design.
DEVELOPMENT
Several problems occurred during the development of the Block I system. The
following paragraphs include details of those problems.
In-Flight Maintenance
In-flight maintenance was deleted for two reasons. First, although it was
technically feasible for the astronaut to detect and replace a defective module or
subassembly, it was not an easy task. Modifications made to fulfill the increased
humidity requirement made the job even more difficult. In addition, under control
system laboratory conditions, a trained technician often required many hours to locate
and replace a defective component. Second, the Block II concept made the SCS a
backup to the PGNCS and called for (1) complete repackaging techniques for humidity
purposes and (2) the addition of redundant control circuits in critical areas; both of
these factors, it was believed, eliminated the need for in-flight maintenance.
Humidity
In 1963, electrical failures occurred on the Mercury-Atlas 9 flight. The failures
were traced to short circuits caused by condensation resulting from an unexpectedly
severe environment of 40- to 70-percent relative humidity at a temperature of 297 + 3 K
(75 ° _+ 5 ° F). On Apollo spacecraft, humidity and temperature are maintained by the
environmental control system (ECS).
The ECS control is effectively limited to the cabin interior; that is, in front of
the equipment panels. The atmosphere behind the panels, in corners, or in protected
pockets is beyond direct control by the ECS. Moisture is removed through the suit
circuit or with a vacuum cleaner. If the temperature falls below the dewpoint (approx-
imately 289 K (60 ° F)), condensation will occur. Analysis indicated that condensed
moisture could be expected in and around the equipment located in the pressurized
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section of the CM evenwith the ECSoperating properly. Basedon thesefactors, a
requirement was establishedthat spacecraft equipmentwithstand 100-percentrelative
humidity during flight operation. Subsequently,the Block I SCSwas modified to fulfill
this newrequirement.
The nature of the Block I changesconsisted of backpottingand addingrubber seals
to the electrical connectors. The system later passedqualification testing andwas
flown successfully on spacecraft 009, 011, 017, and 020. The changein the humidity
requirement wasa major factor in the Block II design concept.
Block I Con nectors
The Block I SCS equipment boxes were interconnected electrically through small
multipin connectors. The female half was attached to the spacecraft, and the male half was
on the equipment enclosure. Mating difficulty was encountered because of the mass and
length of the equipment enclosure and because of the high pin density of the connector. To
mate the connector without breaking or bending pins was extremely difficult. Other prob-
lems included connector body breakage during insertion and removal of the enclosure, con-
nector damage during crimping and pin removal, retention-spring breakage, and pin burrs.
Because of the numerous problems experienced with the connectors, an alternate
procurement source was considered. However, the part was of an advanced design;
and, because of the considerable investment in the original vendor, alternate-source
procurement was considered impractical.
The high breakage and failure rate of the connector led to unexpectedly high
usage of the available supply. This situation eventually resulted in prime-contractor
schedule slippage because the supply was depleted and acceleration of resupply was not
possible. The resupply problem was caused by the inability of the spring retention clip
manufacturer to meet the resupply delivery needs.
The connector problem for Block I was not solved by a design breakthrough or by
the purchase of a different connector; instead, development was continuous until the
end of the Block I program. The redesign and repackaging of the SCS brought about
by the Block II decision included a change to standard connectors. No major problems
were encountered in this area on the Block II system.
Single-Point Failures
The process of searching for and eliminating single-point failures has been long
and tedious. Designers must continually search the wiring diagrams for trouble areas
and document their findings in Failure Mode and Effect Analysis and Single Failure
Point summaries. Examples of single-point failures found and corrected to date are
as follows.
1. SCS logic bus: A single short circuit to ground would disconnect power to all
guidance and control mode and function switches.
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2. TVC servoamplifier power switch: A failure in the single switch used for
both servoamplifiers would disable TVC completely.
3. Entry roll display: A single power bus failure would disableallthree methods
of roll display.
4. SCSdrivers: A single SCSfailure wouldcause the primary modeto disable
the reaction jet drivers.
5. Rotation control for MTVC: A single power failure would leave the rotation
control inoperative during MTVC operation.
The identification of single-point failures is difficult andtime consuming. A
given system generally consists of two modes, the nominal modeandthe backupor
redundantmode. The nominal andredundantmodesare similar, but the system is at
least twice as complex as it wouldbewithout the redundantmode. A failure, of
course, canoccur in either mode. The failure conditions andensuingstates usually
are knownandunderstoodby the designers. Specialfailure tests are performed to
ensure that a single failure (andsometimes a multiple failure) does not disable a
redundantsystem. Although this level of failure analysis is tedious, it is usually
successful.
The level of difficulty for single-point failure analysis increases substantially
whenseveral systems must be combinedto form a total, integrated system. The
permutations of the problem elementsandthe types of failures increase considerably.
Consideration must begiven to power failures, switch failures, andprimary-mode
failures. Although these total-system effects shouldbe analyzedat the time of system
specification so that eachsystem canbedesignedin terms of the whole, this procedure
is seldom followed becauseof time and scheduleconstraints andbecauseof a lack of
detailed understandingof the total concept. As a result, manyhours are spentover
drawings checkingfor the required redundancyafter the hardware hasbeencommitted
for manufacture.
At this point in the failure analysis, modifications of ground rules introduce
problems. For example, anoriginal ground rule was that switches would not short
circuit to ground. Experience with the switches later in the program causedthis
ground rule to be deleted. As a result, a whole newclass of failure possibilities was
introduced.
The complexity of modernspace-flight systems andthe stress onhigh reliability
place a premium on fail-safe designand on minimization of single-point failures.
Unfortunately, the current state of the design process doesnot appearcapableof
handling these requirements. Thus, the developmentof a methodby which a system
may be analyzedfor possible failure modesquickly andthoroughly is highly desirable.
Furthermore, the designers themselvesshouldbe mademore fully consciousof
failure modesandof the importance of system reliability.
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Relay Failures
The relay selected by the SCS subcontractor for use in the Apollo SCS early in
the Block I program was used throughout Block I and, subsequently, throughout
Block II. This relay was chosen on the basis of its performance capability, its per-
formance history, and its size and weight and on the basis of the quality assurance
and reliability procedures and practices of the vendor. Few relay problems were
initially encountered during the Block I program. Each problem or relay failure (six
in all) was analyzed or resolved on its individual merits, and no pattern of failure
modes evolved. One of the six Block I relay failures was caused by an internal solder-
ball. Extensive research and testing were performed to ensure that this was not a
serious problem in the existing Block I SCS. At that time, a change from a soldered
case-to-header assembly to an electron-beam-welded assembly was made, and no
further solderball problems occurred.
The welded-header relay was used exclusively in the Block II SCS. There were
88 such double-pole, double-throw relays used in this system. The subcontractor
procured 4091 relays for the total Apollo Program in two separate 2-week periods
(four lots) during January and July of 1966. Another 451 relays were retained by the
vendor for group B and C lot acceptance test purposes. From this overall total (4542),
there were 27 failures. A limited number of Block II SCS relay malfunctions were
encountered during module testing before November 1966. The number and type of
malfunctions were not unusual or repetitive, and the analysis and establishment of
appropriate corrective action were performed with normal concern. However, in mid-
November 1966, two relay failures occurred during black-box-level testing, including
one in a qualification test. These failures triggered an extensive investigation by the
subcontractor. The effect of the failures at that time was a major concern in the
Apollo Program because many of the electronic systems contained these relays. Hence,
the SCS subcontractor investigation was monitored very closely by both the prime
contractor and NASA.
The two major distinctions made relative to the failures were the types of
failures and the test level at which they occurred. These characteristics are summa-
rized in table I. The relay investigation led to the following specific conclusions.
1. Although the relay-failure-rate predictions based on existing experience had
not met the originally estimated failure-rate predictions, the SCS would meet the system
reliability requirements.
2. Design of the SCS was such that no single relay failure would prevent mission
Success.
3. The relay represented the best proven state-of-the-art design and was fully
acceptable for use in the Apollo Program.
4. Subcontractor in-house module and relay testing effectively screened out
normally open, low-contact-force relays and low-insulation-resistance (wet) relays.
5. There appeared to be no change in the test criteria (at the device, module, or
relay level) from the existing process that would reduce the probability of relay hangup.
19
TABLE I.- RELAY FAILURES
(a) Block I and Block II failures
Relay failures Number
Block I
In the field
At the module level
During device predelivery acceptance testing
During device qualification testing
Subtotal
0
3
1
2
6
Block II
During parts testing
At the module level
During device predelivery production check
During device predelivery acceptance testing
During device qualification testing
During device postdelivery retrofit cycle
Subtotal
Total number of failures in 4542 relays 27
2
14
1
1
2
1
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(b) Relay failure summary
Relay failure mode
Contamination
Normally open contacts
failed to close
Normally closed contacts
failed to open
Normally closed contacts
failed to make contact
Broken internal coil wire
Poor solder connection
Assembly
level
Module
Device
Module
Device
Part
Device
Number of failures
Module
Device
Block I Block I'I
1 5
0 2
2 8
2 2
0 2
0 1
0 1
1 0
Total
6
2
10
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Design Features
The generalhardware design features of the Block II SCS for the Apollo spacecraft
are characterized as follows.
1. The physical system comprises 14 contract end-items (fig. 14 and table II).'
one reaction jet engine on/off control (RJEC); one electronics control assembly (ECA);
one electronics display assembly (EDA); one GDC; one thrust-vector servoamplifier
(TVSA); two gyroscope assemblies (GA-1 and GA-2); two FDAI units; one GP/FPI; 1 one
1 1 1
ASCP; one THC; and two RHC units.
2. These components are hermetically sealed, conduction-cooled, individually
mounted structures; except for the gyroscope assemblies, no vibration isolation is
provided.
3. The packaging of hardware components into individual assemblies is arranged
for a logical functional grouping of system elements and for ease of system malfunction
isolation and troubleshooting.
4. The electronic assemblies are electron-beam-welded aluminum structures
that house stacked, cordwood-type modules containing high-reliability electronic
piece parts. The parts are interconnected by welded sections of bus wires that also
connect to module exit headers. The modules are interconnected by welded exit
connections to bus wires sandwiched between thin Mylar-film matrix sheets. The
matrices are connected to the external connectors by lead wires.
5. Approximately 15 percent of the total system electronics consists of inte-
grated circuit flatpacks that significantly reduce system weight, volume, and power
requirements.
6. The .splay panels and indicators are electron-beam-welded aluminum
structures. 21m indicator enclosures house servometric-type meter movements and
high-reliability electronic piece parts and incorporate EL dial face lighting. The
control panel houses high-reliability electronic resolvers.
7. The hand controllers are aluminum structures incorporating a tapered-wedge-
type lock/stow mounting feature. The controller-handgrip form factors and force and
travel provisions are human-factored for optimum control performance in the space-
flight environment.
8. System functions that are critical to crew safety are ensured by the addition
of switchable redundant circuitry.
1No coldplate cooling.
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RJEC TVSA GA-1 GA-2 • ECA
I
GDC EDA
GP/F'PI
FDAI-1 FDAI-2
ASCP
Figure 14.- Block II stabilization and control system components.
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TABLE H.- HARDWARE PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS
Block II
CEI a
Quantity
per
system
ECA 1
TVSA 1
RJEC 1
EDA 1
GDC 1 11.3
GA
RHC
THC
FDAI
ASCP
GP/FPI
Totals 14
Weight
kg lb
7.5 16.5
5.7 12.5
9.4 20.7
11.4 25.0
24.9
20.8 45.8
8.6 19.0
2.7 6.0
8.2 18.2
1.5 3.3
1.3 2.9
88.4 194.8
Volume
3 3
cm in
9 293 567
7 048 430
13 145 802
12 473 761
11 243 686
17 209 1050
4 589 280
1 836 112
11 473 700
1 147 70
1 180 72
90 636 5530
Block I CEI
equivalent
(b)
Pitch ECA (1)
Yaw ECA (1)
Roll ECA (1)
Display portion
of DECA c (1)
Auxiliary ECA
(I)
AGAP d (1)
portion of
DECA, and
RGP e (1)
RHC (2)
THC (2)
FDAI (I)
AS/GPD f (I)
(g)
Reason for difference
Power saving and reliability
considerations of Block II
concept
Added Block H display
redundancy
Block IIARS mechanization
differences
Reduced criticality of
matched components
Block II requirement of dis-
crete control for each
direction of rotation
Block H requirement for
redundant outputs
No functional difference
Break up displays to provide
greater flexibility of
smaller packages
Add fuel display ana redun-
dancy requirements
Not applicable
acontract end-item.
bNumbers in parentheses indicate quantity.
CDisplay electronics control assembly.
dAttitude gyroscope accelerometer package.
eRate gyroscope package.
fAttitude-set gimbal-position display.
gTotal quantity, 13; totalweight, I08.4 kg (238.9 ib);totalvolume, 106 928 cm 3 (6524 in3).
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TESTING
The testing of the SCS was the culmination of the quality assurance program.
The concepts, requirements, designs, and materials were merged during the testing
into the final product that was demonstrated. The total testing effort was divided into
four distinct categories: development, qualification, acceptance, and installation
checkout tests.
Development Testi ng
The development tests were a series of functional, environmental, and engineering
evaluation tests performed on materials, parts, and components to determine item
suitability for incorporatfoninto the SCS z to determine item performance characteristics,
and to evaluate and improve designs. These tests included such activities as
(1) determination of part, component, and subassembly characteristics: (2) selection
of materials and parts by comparative tests; (3) evaluation in terms of critical envi-
ronment, including anticipated or unknown amplification factors caused by the par-
ticular application; (4) determination of performance stability or repeatability;
(5) evaluation of changed or improved designs; (6) establishment of design margins:
and (7) evaluation of parameter variation effects.
The subcontractor was authorized ten complete engineering systems (five in both
Block I and Block II configurations) to develop flyable configuration hardware. In
Block I, the contractor attempted to enforce formal configuration control between the
contractor and the subcontractor on these development systems. In retrospect, this
practice was neither useful to the program nor helpful to the subcontractor; enforced
configuration control was not even practical from a design standpoint. On Block H,
configuration control was abandoned as a workable method for developing a system;
instead, the more orderly approach of establishing a design baseline followed by for-
mal design reviews was instituted.
Qbalification Testing
The qualification tests consisted of a series of performance and environmental
tests performed on production piece-part, end-item, and system hardware to demon-
strate that the items met all applicable requirements of design and performance.
Materials were qualified by the contractor and listed in an approved materials speci-
fication, which the subcontractor used. When new materials were selected, the
subcontractor tested these materials and submitted test results and samples of each
material to the contractor for approval. Electronic piece parts were procured from
vendors by means of rigidly controlled high-reliability parts specifications. Each
specification contained a section that delineated the testing requirements for the parts.
This section included the following sequential series of tests.
1. Total sample (100 percent) processing tests: Visual inspection, high temper-
ature, constant acceleration, temperature cycle, gross and fine leak tests, particle
detection, burn-in, and X-ray
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2. GroupA acceptancetests: GroupA 100-percent tests, visual inspection,
mechanical inspection, andbasic electrical parameters (GroupA sampletests
includedhigh-temperature leakage, low-temperature gain, offset voltage, anddynamic
resistance. )
3. GroupB lot integrity tests: Visual inspection, mechanical inspection,
solderability, temperature cycling, thermal shock, moisture resistance, shock,
vibration, constantacceleration, terminal strength, salt atmosphere, high-temperature
life, and 1000-houroperating life
The qualification testing of completedend-items andof the system wasdivided
into two major areas: designproof tests and system life tests. The design proof
tests were performed in climatic anddynamic environments andwere imposedonone
unit of eachoperating end-item to specification limits. The system or mission life
tests consisted of exposureof one complete complementof operating end-items (or a
system) first to vibration and then to a salt/fog atmosphere. All these tests were
precededby a checkouttest to establish baseline performance data, andthe environ-
ments thenwere sequencedto optimize use of time andfacilities. Performance data
were takenduring andafter the tests to demonstrate that the SCSmet all applicable
design andperformance requirements and to verify that no serious designweaknesses
existed that could cause inconsistent or marginal performance or a high probability
of failure.
Acceptance Testi ng
Acceptance of completed SCS hardware by the contractor required that acceptance
tests, at both end-item and system levels, be performed successfully before shipment.
Successful performance was defined as a quality-control-witnessed test performed in
accordance with a contractor-approved acceptance test procedure (ATP) wherein all test
parameters measured fell within the specified tolerance limits. Parameters that were
outside these tolerance limits could be submitted as a waiver request, which required
contractor approval before shipment of the hardware. Each ATP specified the detailed
steps to be followed by the test operator in performing the test, the configuration of the
test articles, and any test equipment used to perform the test. Each ATP included the
step-by-step settings to be made, the readings to be taken, the acceptable limits for
each reading, and the instructions for recording data. The sheets on which these data
were recorded became a part of the data package that accompanied each end-item and
system throughout its service life.
Vehicle Checkout
As envisioned early in the Apollo Program, all hardware received from the
subcontractor would undergo a receiving inspection test at the contractor facility.
Before the receipt of the initial hardware, however, this concept was abandoned for one
in which delivered hardware was to be installed directly into the spacecraft. The role
of the contractor was to demonstrate, through tests, the continued functional and
performance capability of the system when mated physically and electrically with actual
spacecraft interfacing systems. The basic philosophy adopted for these tests was
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two-pronged. First, proper system operation in the spacecraft structure andwith
spacecraft power applied throughthe spacecraft interconnectingwire harness was to
be verified. All functions andmodeswere exercised to establishedperformance
requirements within allowable tolerance limits. Second,electrical andfunctional
interface compatibility betweenthe given system and the interfacing systemswas to
be demonstrated. These tests demonstratedcompliancewith the Apollo requirements
for polarity, phasing, switching, scaling, andgain.
The NASA-suppliedautomatic checkoutequipment(ACE)was usedfor testing all
spacecraft systems. This ACE hardware is capableof injecting stimuli and accepting
signal-conditionedreadouts simultaneously for a large number of systems. Useof
ACE supersededthe normal troubleshooting techniquesof past programs in which each
system had its allotted time on the vehicle and its owntest consolewith the capability
for injecting stimuli, acceptingreadouts, and monitoring numeroustest points for
probing suspectedtrouble areas.
Service Life
The original service life requirements for the SCS were specified as 1000 hours
of ground checkout and 400 hours of flight. These values were based on the best
estimates available at the time. The 400 hours of flight represent a typical 14-day
lunar mission and proved to be a good estimate. However, the estimated 1000 hours
of ground checkout time were insufficient.
The subcontractor normally used between 300 and 400 hours before end-item
delivery, considering that power was applied to lower level assemblies and to each
subsequent higher level subassembly through end-item delivery. The contractor then
performed system and combined-systems tests both at the manufacturing facility and
at the launch facility. It became evident that the system had to be qualified to a higher
than specified service life. Subsequently, one complete system was subjected to an
additional 7700 hours of testing with no parameters falling outside the so-called
"mission time extreme environment" values. Each device also was subjected to
individual tests for comparison with the initial values.
FLI GHT RESULTS
Through 15 Apollo flights - 4 unmanned (spacecraft 009, 011, 017, and 020) and
11 manned (spacecraft 101, 103, 104, 106 to 110, and 112 to 114) - no major problems
involving the SCS were encountered, and all SCS test objectives were achieved. In the
following paragraphs, additional information on SCS performance and anomalies for
each specific flight are presented.
1. Apollo-Saturn 201 (spacecraft 009), Apollo-Saturn 202 (spacecraft 011),
Apollo 4 (spacecraft 017), and Apollo 6 (spacecraft 020): The SCS performed satis-
factorily throughout these missions.
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2. Apollo 7 (spacecraft 101): All detailed test objectives were accomplished
satisfactorily. These objectives were SCS attitude control, SCS velocity control,
manual takeover of TVC, and SCS drift checks. Two anomalies were reported during
the Apollo 7 flight: one concerned the commander's RHC and the second concerned the
EDA. The RHC failure (believed to be a sticky cam follower causing failure of a
switch to open) occurred once during the flight. After the flight, the device was
returned to the subcontractor facility, where it was subjected to room-temperature and
high- and low-temperature vacuum tests with satisfactory results; that is, the flight
failure could not be repeated. Design of the hand controller for spacecraft 103 and
subsequent vehicles was different in this particular area (i.e°, the sleeve bearings
had been replaced with ball bearings), and no additional problems were experienced.
In the EDA failure, FDAI-1 failed to t_'ansfer power to the SCS properly. System
tests on the vehicle were performed by the prime contractor with satisfactory results.
The device also passed a complete acceptance test performed by the subcontractor
with no malfunctions. However, simulation of the failure (partial power transfer) on
a subcontractor in-house system revealed that if a particular relay failed, the anomaly
would occur. Although a relay malfunction could not be induced at either the device
or module level, a solderball was found in the relay when it was opened for visual
inspection. It was concluded that, under the zero-g condition in flight, the solderball
could have caused the problem.
3. Apollo 8 (spacecraft 103): The SCS performance was satisfactory throughout
the flight.
4. Apollo 9 (spacecraft 104): The SCS performance was satisfactory throughout
the flight. The detailed test objectives of MTVC takeover from the PGNCS and the
CSM autopilot stability margin-stroking test were accomplished satisfactorily.
5. Apollo 10 (spacecraft 106): In general, the SCS performance was satisfactory
throughout the flight; however, the crewmen stated that the FDAI indicated excessive
drift in the pitch and yaw axes, although no actual measurements were recorded.
After the flight, thorough testing of both gyroscope assemblies and of the GDC at both
device and system levels did not verify the anomaly. A comparison of attitudes
displayed by the SCS and the PGNCS after Earth-orbital insertion showed differences
of less than 0.1 ° in all axes; these fractional differences indicated proper performance
early in the mission. Because no attempt was made to measure the drift accurately,
it was possible that the actual drift of the FDAI was not as great as it appeared. The
anomaly was closed.
6. Apollo 11 (spacecraft 107), Apollo 12 (spacecraft 108), Apollo 13 (space-
craft 109), Apollo 14 (spacecraft 110), Apollo 15 (spacecraft 112), Apollo 16 (space-
craft 113), and Apollo 17 (spacecraft 114): Performance of the SCS was satisfactory
throughout these flights.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
With the exception of three minor anomalies, performance of the stabilization
and control system was satisfactory on all Apollo flights, which included 4 unmanned
and 11 manned vehicles. This success can be attributed to conservative design tech-
niques; use of state-of-the-art components; extensive development, qualification, and
acceptance testing; extensive vehicle checkout at the prime-contractor facilities and
at the John F. Kennedy Space Center; and various simulation programs conducted by
the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (formerly the Manned Spacecraft Center), the
contractor, and the subcontractor.
Following is a list of recommendations that should be considered for any future
program similar to the Apollo Program.
I. A strong effortshould be made to establish baseline requirements before
the start of the hardware design process. For example, requirement changes affecting
hand controllers, humidity, in-flightmaintenance, and many other parameters caused
major redesign during the Apollo Program.
2. Multiple-source procurement should be used for advanced design approaches.
Generally, state-of-the-art design approaches should be adhered to; however, if this
is not possible, alternate sources of procurement should be examined to prevent the
development problems of a supplier from hindering the design of the total system.
3. Firm specifications should be provided for crew personal-preference items.
4. A technique should be used to assistin the rapid identificationof single-
point failures. The Apollo method required many engineers to search diagrams for
problems, but this technique is not altogether successful for complex systems.
5. An accurate low-g propellant-slosh model should be developed. The Apollo
model produced some physically unreasonable results in simulations, and predictions
based on this model were not confirmed by any of the flights.
6. A better method of determining vehicle parameters such as body bending
should be developed. The Apollo SCS underwent several redesigns because of updates
in body-bending data.
7. Criteria and methods to extend the duration of hardware reliability should be
established. The long checkout times for complex space vehicles combined with the
extended duration of some missions place a premium on the storage and long-life
operation of the equipment. As an example, to obtain a realistic service life estimate,
system qualification testing might be extended to the point of hardware wearout.
8. Such devices as hand controllers should be designed as plug-in units so
that cabling can be part of spacecraft wiring. Failure to follow this procedure on
Apollo spacecraft resulted in the development of a completely new cable at a critical
time in the program. Although the problem was resolved, extra care had to be taken
for protecting the cables.
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9. An in-house test capability setup that is maintainedin a current configuration
at all times shouldbeprovided for the investigation of interface, functional, perfor-
manceusage, andoperational problems. Useof sucha capability setupwould minimize
surprises during the initial operational phasesof a program andprevent use of a
flight vehicle as a test bed in resolving complex problems.
10. Serious consideration should be given to the use of solid-state switching in
lieu of relays. If relays are used, superscreening tests should be established to ensure
high reliability.
11. Autopilots should be designed such that less sensitivity to spacecraft design
variations (changes in vehicle bending mode frequencies and amplitudes caused by
mass property changes) exists.
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Houston, Texas, May 30, 1974
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